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This Article is part of a Symposium on "reconciling public values
and individual rights in constitutional adjudication." Few topics are
more important, especially in a liberal society predicated on the im-
portance of recognizing (and then safeguarding) individual rights.'
One recognition of their importance, of course, is precisely that we
require, as a doctrinal matter, the existence of a "compelling interest"
on the part of the state before these rights can be abridged. Yet one
t For presentation at "When Is a Line as Long as a Rock Is Heavy?: Reconciling
Public Values and Individual Rights in Constitutional Adjudication," Hastings College of
the Law, San Francisco, California, February 26, 1994.
* W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Regents Chair in Law, Uni-
versity of Texas Law School. I am grateful to Jack Balkin, Sam Issachariff, Doug Laycock,
Rick Pildes, Scot Powe, and Fred Schauer for reactions to an earlier draft of this Article.
I am also immensely grateful to Dean David Frohamayer, the former Attorney Gen-
eral of Oregon; Jerome Lidz, of the Oregon Department of Justice; and Professor Hans
Linde, who was a member of the Oregon Supreme Court that decided the various Smith
cases discussed in the text, for their responses to an earlier version. None of them, of
course, should be held responsible for any of my own analyses and arguments. (Indeed,
note 79 infra contains a long dissent by Mr. Lidz to the interpretation that I offer.)
1. I put to one side, for purposes of this Article, the so-called "critique of rights" that
was an important part of the jurisprudential debate during the 1980s. See, e.g., Mark
ushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEx. L. Rav. 1363 (1984) (critique); Kimberle Williams
Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment. Transformation and Legitimation in Antidis-
crimination Law, 101 HARv. L. Rv. 1331 (1988) (defense of rights); see also PATRICIA
WILLIAMS, Tim ALcrvmy OF RACE AND Rirrs (1991). For purposes of this Article, I
will assume both that certain rights exist (at least in the sense of being conventionally
accepted) and are protected by the Constitution, and that at least some of these rights are
admirable and thus deserving of protection. That is, in the context of this Article, it is




would not bother to hold the symposium in the first place if it were
crystal clear what counts as such an interest. Indeed, anyone who ac-
tually teaches constitutional law knows that few things are less clear
than the operation of the compelling interest doctrine.
I want to offer some of my own reflections on how we might iden-
tify the compelling state interest through close examination of the
opinions and aftermath of one of the most (in)famous-and contro-
versial-cases of the past decade, Employment Division v. Smith, the
so-called Oregon Peyote Case.2 But I should make it clear at the out-
set that I am interested in examining more than the judicial opinions.
Important as they may be, they are only one aspect of the various
legal decisions made in the course of the overall episode for which
Smith serves only as a synecdoche-the use of a part as a symboliza-
tion of a whole. It is, I think, the central failing of contemporary con-
stitutional analysts that they restrict constitutional analysis almost
exclusively to the work-product of judges (and, most often, federal
judges). Such a focus leads us to ignore the extent to which a vibrant
constitutionalism-assuming that it is any longer possible to imagine
such a thing-requires a certain disposition on the part of all who par-
ticipate in the work of a constitutional republic. As Karl Llewellyn
pointed out many years ago, we must be interested in the thought and
behavior of all legal "officials" and not only that small subset of per-
sons called judges.3 Among these officials, of course, are members of
state legislatures and of executive agencies. Thus, in addition to the
Smith decision in the Supreme Court, I shall be discussing-and rais-
ing questions about-the decisional procedures of the Oregon Legis-
lature and of the Oregon Attorney General, insofar as they are
relevant to arriving at a cogent notion of testing for the presence of a
"compelling state interest" that will justify the limitation of important
individual rights.
I. Smith I-IV
What we now identify as Smith initially arose out of Oregon's
denial of unemployment benefits to drug counsellors who were dis-
missed for violating organizational policy by using peyote, an illegal
drug, even though the use occurred in Native American religious cere-
2. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
[Smith IV].
3. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930). Excerpts of this piece are reprinted in WILLIAM FISHER ET AL., AMERI-
CAN LEGAL REALISM 56-58 (1993).
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monies.4 Originally, the Oregon Supreme Court held that because
"[t]he denial of unemployment benefits significantly burdened" mem-
bers of the Native American Church who used peyote in their wor-
ship, it was impermissible under the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.5 The United States Supreme Court vacated and re-
manded, however, holding that there must be a definitive determina-
tion of whether using peyote.for religious purposes is legally protected
against criminalization before the constitutional issue raised by the de-
nial of unemployment benefits could be resolved.
6
On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court then held that even
though Oregon's statute did not allow the sacramental use of peyote,
the Free Exercise Clause mandated an exemption for Native Ameri-
cans who used the drug in traditional religious rituals.7 The United
4. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660 (1988)
[Smith II].
5. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 721 P.2d 445, 450 (Or.
1986) [Smith I]. It is worth noting that the court followed its standard practice, see Salem
College & Academy v. Employment Div., 695 P.2d 25 (Or. 1985), of first deciding how the
case would be resolved under the Oregon Constitution. The operative Oregon unemploy-
ment law allowed denial of unemployment benefits if the employee was "discharged for
misconduct connected with work." Smith I, 721 P.2d at 448 (citing OR. REV. STAT.
§ 657.176(2)(a) (1991)). The court stated:
Here it was not the government that disqualified claimant from his job for in-
gesting peyote. And the rule denying unemployment benefits to one who loses
his job for what an employer permissibly considers misconduct, conduct incom-
patible with doing the job, is itself a neutral rule.... As long as disqualification by
reason of the religiously based conduct is peculiar to the particular employment
and most other jobs remain open to the worker, we do not believe that the state is
denying the worker a vital necessity in applying the "misconduct" exception of
the unemployment compensation.
Id. at 449. At this point, the court turned to consideration of Smith's claim under the
United States Constitution, and it found that "he is entitled to prevail under the federal
First Amendment," id., because "the denial of unemployment benefits significantly bur-
dened Smith's free exercise rights," id. at 450.
6. Smith II, 485 U.S. at 673-74.
7. Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (Or.
1988) [Smith III]. The Oregon Supreme Court refused to decide whether the Oregon Con-
stitution itself would have protected Smith against criminal prosecution:
If disqualification from unemployment compensation hinged on guilt or inno-
cence or an uncharged and untried crime, it would raise issues of the applicable
mental state and of changing burdens of proof for which the compensation proce-
dure is neither designed nor equipped. Because no criminal case is before us, we
do not give an advisory opinion on the circumstances under which prosecuting
members of the Native American Church under [Oregon Revised Statutes Sec-
tion 475.992(4)(a), the statute prohibiting the ingestion of peyote] for sacramental
use of peyote would violate the Oregon Constitution.
Id at 148 n.3. It therefore went on to decide the case under the federal First Amendment.
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States Supreme Court reversed." The majority, through Justice Scalia,
held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prevent the state from "en-
forc[ing] generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful con-
duct." 9 The opinion further stated that the Clause simply does not
"require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law"'10 that
could itself pass the standard test of minimal rationality. That such
enforcement might be devastating to the religious practices of those
against whom enforcement is carried out is ostensibly constitutionally
irrelevant. As my colleague Douglas Laycock has caustically written,
"In effect, the Court held that every American has a right to believe in
a religion, but no right to practice it" when a practice, however central
to the religion, runs afoul of a generally applicable law."
Justice Scalia's opinion received a great deal of well-deserved
criticism,12 much of which focused on his analysis of prior case law,
which, contrary to his own assertions, seemed quite clearly to require
that the state present a "compelling interest" in such circumstances.
But other critics attacked his almost insouciant tone in "leaving ac-
commodation [of minority religions] to the political process" as an
"unavoidable consequence of democratic government," even if this
places "at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not
widely engaged in."'1 3 Ironically enough, Scalia's faith in the ability of
the ordinary democratic process to protect vulnerable religious minor-
ities seems in fact to have been vindicated by two events that followed
Smith. First, the Oregon legislature amended the Oregon criminal
code in 1991 to offer religiously motivated peyote users a defense
against prosecution.' 4 Then, in 1993, an almost unanimous Congress
5
8. Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 890.
9. Id. at 885.
10. Id. at 882.
11. Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV.
221, 221 [hereinafter Laycock, RFRA].
12. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1;
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. Clii. L.
REV. 1109 (1990); Harry F. Tepker, Jr., Hallucinations of Neutrality in the Oregon Peyote
Case, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1 (1991).
13. Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 890.
14. The statute lists three requirements that a user (or intended user) must meet in
order to assert the affirmative defense: (1) that the peyote is used "[in connection with
the good faith practice of a religious belief"; (2) that the use is "directly associated with a
religious practice"; and (3) that it is done "[i]n a manner that is not dangerous to the health
of the user or others who are in the proximity of the user." OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(5)
(1991).
Indeed, Idaho also amended its laws after Smith to provide a specific exemption from
its drug laws for the "sacramental use of peyote," at least when used by "persons of native
American descent who are members or eligible for membership in a federally recognized
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passed and President Clinton signed the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act of 1993 (RFRA),' 6 which effectively overruled Smith.
The Oregon story is quite interesting, and it will take up a signifi-
cant portion of what follows. First, though, it is worth looking at
RFRA, which applies to virtually every conceivable form of public
government.17 All of these entities are prohibited from "substantially
burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion""' unless the government
"demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-(1) is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est." 19 The "congressional findings" include recognition that Smith
"virtually eliminated" any significant burden on government in regard
to laws, however "neutral" they may be, that affect religious prac-
tices.20 Furthermore, Congress found that "the compelling interest
test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing
prior governmental interests."'2' Thus, the two "purposes" of the Act
are restoring the "compelling interest test" as enunciated (and pre-
sumably enforced) in two earlier cases, Sherbert v. Verner22 and Wis-
consin v. Yoder,23 and "provid[ing] a claim or defense to persons
whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government." 24
To some extent, then, Justice Scalia's opinion, whatever its intel-
lectual strengths and weaknesses, is a dead letter-assuming, of
course, that Congress has the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to overrule Smith. That is surely an interesting question,
Indian tribe" and when the use takes place on an Indian reservation. See 1991 Idaho Sess.
Laws ch. 125, § 1 (codified at IDAio CODE § 37-2732A (1992)). I am grateful to David
Frolnmayer for providing me with this information.
15. The vote was 97-3 in the Senate, while the House of Representatives was unani-
mous in its support. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, N.Y.
TMius, Nov. 17, 1993, at A18.
16. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(1993) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (West Supp. 1994)) [hereinafter
RFRA].
17. "Government" is defined as any "branch, department, agency, instrumentality,
and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States, a State, or a
subdivision of a State... includ[ing] the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Pu-
erto Rico, and each territory and possession of the United States." RFRA § 5(1)-(2).
18. Id. § 3(a).
19. Id. § 3(b) (emphasis added).
20. Id. § 2(a)(4).
21. Id. § 2(a)(5).
22. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
23. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
24. RFRA § 2(b).
but it is not one that concerns me in this piece.z5 What does concern
me is what it might mean to require the demonstration of a compel-
ling interest, either in this area of doctrine or, indeed, in any other
dealing with the protection of the individual rights that are the major
focus of this Symposium. The compelling interest doctrine often
arises, after all, precisely in the context of the abridgement of liberties
seemingly protected against any state limitation. To quote Laycock
once more: "The stringency of the compelling interest test, [at least
with regard to the First Amendment,] makes sense in light of its ori-
gins; it is a judicially implied exception to the constitutional text."2 6
Understanding the operation of compelling interest arguments thus
enables us to understand, at one and the same time, the actual doctri-
nal protection of individual liberties.
I said above that RFRA in effect overrules Smith, but readers of
the opinions in that case know that that description may be danger-
ously misleading, at least from the perspective of those who in fact
seek far more vigorous judicial protection of religious conduct. Why
is that so? The answer lies in Justice O'Connor's opinion, which both
explicitly adopted the compelling interest standard as codified in
RFRA and concurred in the judgment, which, of course, allowed
criminalization. 27 O'Connor's opinion has received significantly less
examination than Justice Scalia's, though I believe it to be far more
slipshod in its analysis and equally, if not more, deserving of condem-
nation than Scalia's opinion. Putting Scalia's treatment of prior cases
to one side, his basic argument about the reach of generally applicable
laws to religious would-be dissenters is a weighty one, as evidenced by
the support given the result in Smith by such thoughtful analysts as
Mark Tushnet,28 William Marshall,29 and Suzanna Sherry.30 Defend-
ers of Smith-and the opponents of RFRA-are reasonable people
25. For a thoughtful analysis of this issue, see Laycock, RFRA, supra note 11, at 245-
54.
26. Id. at 233. Textual argument obviously does not explain the imposition of a com-
pelling interest requirement with regard to the use of racial classifications, at least under
the Fourteenth Amendment, see City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1988).
The Equal Protection Clause is totally silent concerning what classifications may or may
not be used by government and, of course, it would be absurd to interpret the Equal Pro-
tection Clause as requiring a compelling interest for differentiating among groups at all.
27. See Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 891 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, also applied a compelling interest test in their
sharp dissent from the opinion. Id. at 907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Congress did not
indicate whether it believed Blackmun, rather than O'Connor, correctly applied its test.
28. Mark Thshnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 117.
29. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991) (defending the outcome but not Justice Scalia's opinion); see also
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who make serious arguments, especially given the total failure of Con-
gress to define "religion" or otherwise confront the spate of cases,
many of them involving drugs, that seek exemption from the general
laws of the state. Many would undoubtedly agree with David
Frohnmayer, Attorney General of Oregon at that time, who invited
the Court to look carefully at such cases, "which are shamelessly re-
sult-driven and involve religious gerrymandering from which no con-
sistent neutral principle emerges. '31 In a country as rich in religious
sectarianism as the United States, only the most foolish can be
unambivalent about the actual consequences of RFRA, even if, on
balance, one supports it, as I do.
Quite frankly, I am unwilling to extend the same generosity to
Justice O'Connor as I am to Justice Scalia. I believe that her opinion
is truly indefensible in a way that is not the case with Scalia's. And, as
noted earlier, RFRA makes it more important than ever to give that
opinion close attention.
O'Connor's doctrinal standard is practically identical to RFRA:
"[T]he Government [must] justify any substantial burden on relig-
iously motivated conduct by a compelling state interest and by means
narrowly tailored t9 achieve that interest. '32 Elsewhere in the opin-
ion, she states that "the Government [must] demonstrate that unbend-
ing application of its regulation to the religious objector 'is essential to
accomplish an overriding governmental interest.' ' 33
William P. Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Exercise Ex-
emption, 40 CASE W. Rns. L. REv. 357 (1989).
30. Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman: Paradox Redux, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 123, 150.
31. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 872 (No. 88-1213). I am
grateful to now-Dean Frohnmayer for his kindness in supplying me with this transcript.
This is a theme of his brief as well, in which he notes that "[r]eligiously motivated drug use
is not a phenomenon unique to one church, one religious belief system, or one narrow
group of religious adherents." Brief for Petitioners at 18, Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 872 (No.
88-1213). Some of these churches may go back centuries; others, as he laconically notes,
"have been borne of more contemporary revelation." Id. at 19 (citing Leary v. United
States, 383 F.2d 851, 857-59 (5th Cir. 1967)). "[I]f the Free Exercise Clause protects relig-
iously motivated drug use from the reach of comprehensive drug control schemes, govern-
ment must attempt to craft religion-by-religion, drug-by-drug, and individual-by-individual
exemptions from these laws." Id. at 20-21. According to Attorney General Frohnmayer,
not only would this "wreak havoc with a government's efforts to control dangerous drug
use in this country," id. at 21, but it also "raises the potential for government to discrimi-
nate among religions and to suggest preference for some sects over others," which obvi-
ously raises the most delicate Establishment Clause concerns, id. at 17.
32. Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
33. Id. at 899 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982)) (emphasis
added).
It is worth noting that the so-called compelling interest test in fact
has two important components. The first focuses simply on the values
at stake. Does the state defend its law by reference to a value that is
indeed of special (compelling) import? Obviously, however, even
agreement about the importance of the value is not enough to win a
case, because the other component involves assessing the means by
which the state safeguards this important value. One cannot win a
case merely by noting that it involves such ordinarily compelling inter-
ests as national defense or the war on drugs itself. Could the state
criminalize speech that argued that the purported dangers of a given
drug are wildly overrated, that suggested it indeed is beneficial in one
important aspect or another (including the sheer pleasure it produces
in the user), and that called for its decriminalization? I presume that
the answer is no, even if such speech would have a tendency to lead to
drug use by someone persuaded by it. In this instance, one "compel-
ling interest"-deterrence of drug use-is countered by another
one-preservation of freedom of speech against regulation by law.
What must take place, even after the demonstration of a compelling
value, is a more empirical inquiry which will demonstrate that the
means chosen to achieve the compelling value are indeed narrowly
tailored, with almost no overinclusion, to attain the result. That is, the
means expended to protect some important value A should be mini-
mally costly to some other, equally protected, value B. This is surely
one meaning of the standard notion that "least restrictive alterna-
tives" be chosen when fundamental liberties are imposed upon.
34
Any confidence (or fear) that Justice O'Connor might be truly
serious in offering a trenchant analysis of both the values and facts of
Smith is dissipated when one considers her analysis of the Oregon
statute itself. For O'Connor, "Oregon's criminal prohibition repre-
sents that State's judgment that the possession and use of controlled
substances, even by only one person, is inherently harmful and dan-
gerous." 35 And "uniform application of the criminal prohibition at
issue is essential to the effectiveness of Oregon's stated interest in
preventing any possession of peyote. ' 36 Thus, she says, Oregon need
not accommodate the hapless Native Americans, whatever the "se-
34. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 369 (1976). The concept apparently traces
back to Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960), in which the Court wrote that "even
though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be
more narrowly achieved."
35. Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 905 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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vere burden" that she readily concedes is placed upon their "ability
... to freely exercise their religion.
'37
How might one make sense of O'Connor's argument? Let me
offer some possibilities. First, one might view the compelling interest
test as triggering the same kind of genuinely strict scrutiny as is found
in classic free speech cases, where the Supreme Court engages in basi-
cally de novo review in order to determine that the enormity of sup-
pressing someone's freedom of speech is indeed justified.38 In such
cases, it is basically irrelevant that Congress or a state legislature, a
jury, and an appellate court found the speech unprotected, because,
for example, it is defined as pornographic and beyond the pale of so-
cially acceptable presentation. The Court must see the movie or read
the book and judge for itself. There is almost no sense of deference to
any other decision maker. The Court engages in first-order decision
making. That is, the judge (or Justice) reviewing the prosecution be-
low must ask herself, "Would I have voted to convict?", rather than
the second-order question "Were the decision makers below reason-
able in coming to the conclusion they did, regardless of whether I
would have agreed with them?"
In the context of reviewing legislation, the Court becomes a
quasi-legislature insofar as, once more, the Justice asks, "Would I as a
legislator have voted for this legislation?", rather than asking only
whether a reasonable person might have supported it even against the
Justice's own opposition. "Strict" scrutiny is first-order judgment,
while the "minimum rationality" test embraced by Justice Scalia's
opinion is the standard example of second-order review.
Justice O'Connor's use-twice-of the word "essential" in
describing Oregon's criminalization of all peyote use is especially in-
teresting in the context of such truly strict scrutiny, for the first defini-
tions of that word in a standard dictionary are "absolutely necessary"
and "indispensable." 39 The historically-minded reader may of course
be reminded of that most essential of all opinions in American consti-
tutional history, McCulloch v. Maryland,40 which at least in part turns
37. Id. at 903.
38. As is often the case, I have very much profited from conversation with Fred
Schauer, as well as from his writing addressed to this point. See Frederick Schauer, The
Role of the People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REv. 761 (1986), for an illumi-
nating demonstration of the minimal role assigned institutions other than the judiciary in
classical First Amendment theory.
39. THm RANDOM HoUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 451 (rev. ed. 1988).
40. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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on the meaning assigned to the terms "necessary and proper."'41 Just
as "necessary" for Marshall (like Hamilton before him) 42 ultimately
meant only "convenient" or "useful," perhaps "essential" for
O'Connor means something reasonably believed to be a relevant
means to achieving some important end. But, of course, this connota-
tion is very close to the "minimum rationality" test she is at pains to
denounce as inadequate to protect religious liberty.
In any event, O'Connor herself engages in nothing that might be
termed first-order scrutiny or application of any stringent notion of
essentiality, however often she might use that word. There is simply
no evidence that she engaged in any genuinely independent examina-
tion of the record to evaluate either the actual threat to social order
presented by use of peyote in religious rituals, or why it was, precisely,
that Oregon could not have granted the same narrowly tailored ex-
emption to the Native American litigants as do the federal govern-
ment and at least eleven states.43 "[O]ther governments may surely
choose to grant an exemption without Oregon, with its specific as-
serted interest in uniform application of its drug laws, being required
to do so by the First Amendment. '44 But she presents no argument at
all to indicate that conditions in Oregon were such that it would in-
deed pay a significant cost in enforcing the drug laws if the exemption
were granted. The absence of any such argument makes it impossible
to place her notion of compelling interest within the ambit of standard
free speech scrutiny and a serious concern about whether any in-
fringements of basic liberty will be empirically assessed in the way
suggested by such terms as "narrow tailoring" or "least restrictive
alternatives."
There is at least one other way to understand the notion of strict
scrutiny, which looks more closely at the process of decision making,
in contrast to the kinds of cases mentioned immediately above, which
focus almost entirely on the result of the process. Let me offer the
following passage as a plausible paraphrase of Justice O'Connor's
meaning:
41. See id. at 413-19. For a reprint of Marshall's entire opinion, unedited, see PAUL
BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 19-31,
42-47 (3d ed. 1992). For the discussion of the meaning of the "necessary and proper"
clause, see id. at 26-27.
42. Alexander Hamilton, "Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a
Bank," in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97 (1965), reprinted in BREST & LEVIN-
SON, supra note 41, at 14, 15-16.
43. See Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 906 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
44. Id. (emphasis in original).
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The people of Oregon, operating through their legislative delegates,
after due deliberation, decided (1) that protection of Oregon's
health, safety, and welfare demanded the criminalization of peyote
and (2) that any exemption at all from the reach of the criminal law
would so threaten the interests protected by criminalization that it
was truly essential to engage in universal prohibition of peyote use.
Whether or not I personally agree with this determination, there
can be no doubt in my mind that the decision was taken only after
solemn reflection on the profound-and conflicting-social values
at stake. We most certainly do not sit as a "superlegislature" to veto
decisions made by the ordinary political branches of government, at
least so long as we are assured that they gave due notice to the issues
raised by the legislation in question.
These comments, of course, reflect review of the adequacy of the
decision-making process below. Once again McCulloch is highly rele-
vant, inasmuch as Marshall notes, in the too-often-ignored first part of
his opinion, that "[t]he bill for incorporating the bank of the United
States did not steal upon an unsuspecting legislature, and pass unob-
served. Its principle was completely understood, and was opposed
with equal zeal and ability."45 Indeed, not only was it first considered
"in the fair and open field of debate"; it also received intense scrutiny
within the executive branch. Both Secretary of State Thomas Jeffer-
son and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton submitted for-
mal opinions to President Washington setting out, respectively, the
arguments against and for Congress's power to charter a bank.46 Mar-
shall was not engaging in puffery when he described the "persevering
talent" behind the debate, nor, for that matter, when he referred to
"arguments which convinced minds as pure and as intelligent as this
country can boast."47
Marshall's argument immediately raises the question treated in
Justice Linde's classic article on "due process of lawmaking. '48 In that
article he vividly illustrated the problems with reading the Constitu-
tion as what I sometimes call a "menu"-that is, as offering a clear set
of permitted outcomes and an equally clear set of prohibitions. In-
stead, a better understanding of the Constitution might yield the no-
tion that it is best read as focusing our attention on the processes by
which decisions are made. One need not agree with Linde's evocation
of Alexander Bickel's insistence that "[tjhe highest morality is almost
45. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
46. See BREsr & LEViNSON, supra note 41, at 13-14 (Jefferson), 14-17 (Hamilton).
47. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402.
48. Hans Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. Rav. 197 (1976).
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always the morality of process"49 in order to accept the proposition
that process is indeed important. Terrance Sandalow has made a simi-
lar argument in a context especially relevant to the concerns of this
Symposium:
[I]f governmental action trenches upon values that may reasonably
be regarded as fundamental, that action should be the product of a
deliberate and broadly based political judgment. The stronger the
argument that governmental action does encroach upon such val-
ues, the greater the need to assure that it is the product of a process
that is entitled to speak for the society. Legislation that has failed
to engage the attention of [the legislature], like the decisions of
subordinate governmental institutions, does not meet that test, for it
is likely to be the product of partial political pressures that are not
broadly reflective of the society as a whole.50
Not at all coincidentally, Justice Stevens quoted both Linde and
Sandalow in his dissenting opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick, where the
plurality upheld the use of racial classifications in the implementation
of federally financed programs.5 1 Of all of the current members of the
Court, it is Stevens who seems most interested in classic legal process
argumentation. Noting Chief Justice Burger's statement in the major-
ity opinion, which upheld the federal racial preference in question,
that the Court must engage in a "most searching examination to make
sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees,"5 2 Stevens
indicated his own belief that "due process requires that the 'most
searching examination' be conducted in the first instance by Congress
rather than by a federal court. '5 3 What effect might this process re-
quirement have had on the Court's review of the Oregon peyote law?
49. Id. at 255 (quoting Alexander Bickel, Watergate and the Legal Order, COMMEN-
TARY, Jan. 1974, at 25).
50. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MiCH. L. REV. 1162, 1188
(1977).
51. 448 U.S. 448, 549, 551 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 491 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 552 n.29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also Justice Stevens's opinion for the
Court in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483 (1994), concerning the retroactive
application of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). He
noted that "the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurispru-
dence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic. Elementary con-
siderations of fairness," recognized in several constitutional provisions, "dictate that
individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their con-
duct accordingly; settled expectations should not be lightly disrupted." Id. at 1497. Thus,
"retroactive statutes raise particular concerns," id., including fear that Congress's "respon-
sivity to political pressures" may tempt it "to use retroactive legislation as a means of
retribution against unpopular groups or individuals," id. Special attention must be given
by the Court in such cases, even as it recognizes that "the potential unfairness of retroac-
tive civil legislation is not a sufficient reason for a court to fail to give a statute its intended
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H. Constitutional Burdens on the Due Process of
Lawmaking
Presumably, a court that fails to find such a "searching examina-
tion" in any case demanding a "compelling interest" should in effect
"remand" the case back to the legislature for further consideration.5 4
Such consideration would have a dual component. First, there would
be a conscious weighing of values: Does the purported governmental
interest really outweigh the constitutional value that we now realize is
implicated in the challenged legislation? This is inevitably linked to
the second inquiry: As an empirical matter, is there really no less re-
strictive or more narrowly tailored way to achieve the state's goals
than infringing upon the constitutional value?
This latter notion of strict scrutiny review is obviously rooted in
the legal-process tradition. It does not direct our attention solely to
the particular legislative outcome, nor does it treat the Constitution as
a simple menu of permitted or prohibited results. Rather, it focuses
on the extent to which the procedures below justify confidence that
important interests at stake were genuinely considered by the decision
makers. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's own jurisprudence in other areas
can be offered in support of the importance of process considerations.
Consider, for example, her argument in Gregory v. Ashcrof 5
that the Constitution's commitment to federalism requires that any
incursions on the essential "political functions" of state governments,
including employment policy, be accompanied by a "plain statement"
of such an intention by Congress. "[We will not," said O'Connor,
speaking for the majority, "attribute to Congress an intent to intrude
on state governmental functions . . . . 6 The "plain statement" rule
obviously does not question Congress's substantive power; instead, it
scope," inasmuch as "retroactivity provisions often serve entirely benign and legitimate
purposes." Id. at 1498. The answer, though, is not case-by-case balancing, in which the
Court weighs the various interests involved, but, rather, a clear statement by Congress that
national interests do indeed require retroactivity. "[A] requirement that Congress first
make its intention clear helps ensure that Congress itself has determined that the benefits of
retroactivity outweigh the potential disruption or unfairness." Id. (emphasis added). In the
absence of such evidence of congressional weighing, the default rule is no retroactivity.
54. The notion of a "remand" or "referring" function is, of course, not original with
me. For discussion see ALEXANDER BICKEL, Ti LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 165-66
(1962); PHILIP C. BOBBrrr, CONSTrTUTIONAL FATE 192, 195 (1982). I make a "remand"
argument in the context of the Ninth Amendment in Sanford Levinson, Constitutional
Rhetoric and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 131, 157-59 (1988).
55. 111 S. Ct. 2395 (1991). I owe this point to Richard Pildes.
56. Id. at 2406. Justice O'Connor also joined in Justice Stevens's "plain statement"
opinion in Landgraf.
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establishes a procedural hurdle that proponents of regulation must
run. In effect, they must explicitly notify their legislative colleagues of
the incursion on important state interests and thus force them to ac-
cept political responsibility for any loss of state autonomy that might
ensue. In the absence of such notification and consequent authoriza-
tion, the default rule leaves states unregulated. One might, of course,
have adopted a similar default rule in cases like Smith, in which the
absence of boilerplate language stipulating a legislative desire to en-
force the law even against religiously motivated disobedience would
lead to protection for the religious. There can, I think, be no serious
doubt that O'Connor is simply more worried about incursions on state
autonomy than about limitations on the free exercise of religion, how-
ever much she may, in some abstract sense, truly regret the latter.
Assume, though, that some kind of process test were used to eval-
uate the application of Oregon's peyote law to those using it in reli-
gious ceremonies. If we look for evidence of serious legislative
concern with the values at stake, what do we find if we look at the
actual record in Smith? The answer, at least with respect to the Ore-
gon legislature, is nothing whatsoever. That is, there is not even the
proverbial scintilla of evidence, at least in the published judicial pro-
ceedings, to indicate that the Oregon legislature, aware of the costs to
Native Americans (and possibly others) of general application of the
proposed Oregon law, debated the issue and then decided, perhaps
with heavy heart, that Oregon's "compelling" need to control the
plague of drugs required blanket coverage without exemption.
There is, though, evidence of sorts (perhaps the same kind of evi-
dence as "subsequent repair" following an accident) concerning what
the reaction of the Oregon legislature might have been, had it in fact
engaged in anything that might be labeled genuine deliberation about
the issue. That evidence is provided by its alacrity in amending the
Oregon law in question following Smith. Oregon law now states that
"it is an affirmative defense" in a criminal prosecution "that the pe-
yote is being used ... in connection with the good faith practice of a
religious belief. ' 57 An editorial in the March 2, 1992 Oregonian, re-
ferring to a hearing about to be held in Portland by the United States
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs on "American Indian reli-
gious freedom," described the 1991 Oregon legislature as "angered at
the use of the law by former Attorney General Dave Frohnmayer in a
57. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(5) (1991).
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manner to impede" Native American religious rituals, "so the
lawmakers modified the statute" as indicated.58
It is, of course, possible, though I think highly unlikely, that the
1991 Oregon legislature was in fact significantly different in value
preference and perception of the empirical world from its predecessor
that had passed the statute criminalizing peyote without including an
exemption. A more likely scenario, I think, is that the earlier legisla-
ture never thought about the problem and, therefore, that the 1991
hearings prior to passage of the amendment represented the first seri-
ous consideration by the legislature of the issues at stake.5 9 Upon be-
ing made fully aware of them, the Oregon legislature limited the reach
of its statute-presumably after a determination that the costs to Ore-
gon's program of drug control would not in fact be severely affected
by the exemption. So RFRA turns out to be neither a necessary (nor
possibly even a sufficient) condition for reversing the specific result in
Smith II insofar as it upheld the constitutionality of Oregon's criminal-
ization of peyote use.
For supporters of'the rights of American Indians, the story thus
has a happy ending. But what if the day of hearings had included
vigorous opposition from law enforcement officers who persuaded the
legislature that it just could not afford to exempt the religious use of
peyote without paying too high a cost in terms of the general attempt
to control the distribution and use of dangerous drugs in Oregon? A
serious process approach cannot have only one permitted ending to
the narrative; the whole point is that, contrary to Aristotelian logic,
both A and -A can count as "correct" (or at least permitted) answers
to the-questffin of constitutional meaning, as long as the procedures
followed in figuring out the answer are acceptable. One wonders
what future courts interpreting RFRA will do if faced with records
reflecting genuine grappling by the legislature in question. It would,
to put it mildly, represent a sea change of the highest order for courts
to shift from the almost meaningless review under "minimal rational-
ity" to the basically de novo review typical of the classic freedom-of-
speech paradigm.
58. THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Mar. 2, 1992, at B6. For this reference, as well as for
much other help, I am indebted to Marlyn Robinson of the Tarlton Law Library at the
University of Texas Law School.
59. Hearings were held on April 5, 1991, with a half-dozen witnesses testifying in
favor of the exemption and none opposing it. I am indebted to Tim Backer, of the Oregon
State Archives, for sending me an eight-page summary transcription of these hearings.
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But to what extent should process buffs demand scrutiny by the
legislature-as distinguished, for example, from the executive branch
or the agencies delegated, in the modem administrative state, the task
of giving regulatory flesh to the often extraordinarily vague and gen-
eral statutes passed by legislatures? There is one obviously good rea-
son for refraining from any meaningful procedural requirements with
regard to those issues handled under the rubric of minimal rationality:
No legislature has the time to devote serious consideration to more
than a tiny fraction of the issues brought before it. Many statutes can
legitimately be handled by reference to "common sense." And, to the
extent that errors will be made, when "common sense" turns out, as is
often the case, to be deficient, then by definition the error costs are
not unacceptably high because they impinge only on what have been
deemed less-than-fundamental constitutional interests. But the mat-
ter is just as obviously different when fundamental interests are at
stake; here, the error costs should be borne by the state, and it
scarcely seems radical to suggest that the risks of error go up signifi-
cantly when the state has not even seriously addressed the issue
through some kind of formal process, including hearings when the
possibility of significant effects on the enjoyment of fundamental
rights emerges. But perhaps executive due process of lawmaking can
cure any defect in the legislative process.
IlL. The Role of the Public Attorney
At this point constitutional theory intersects with my other major
area of teaching and scholarly inquiry, which is professional responsi-
bility. What should be expected of public attorneys-particularly
those at the highest level, such as state attorneys general or the Solici-
tor General of the United States-when considering legislation passed
by legislatures the constitutionality of which is then challenged? To be
precise, should we expect a public attorney in some significant sense
to "warrant" to the Court the arguments that he or she makes on be-
half of challenged legislation, particularly when the challenge is
brought in the name of a constitutional value that triggers strict scru-
tiny and demands the presentation of a compelling state interest in
response?
Normally, we do not require attorneys to believe their own argu-
ments. Although Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
its appellate analogues prohibit the presentation of "frivolous" argu-
ments to a court, attorneys are fully licensed-indeed, they may well
be obligated-to present arguments they do not at all believe will or,
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more importantly, should be accepted by the court.60 That is,
whatever merit there may be in Ronald Dworkin's image of the judge
as seeking the "best constructive interpretation of the community's
legal practice,"'61 it tells us nothing at all about the lawyer, who seeks
only such arguments as serve his or her client. Normally, we simply
have no basis for inferring from a lawyer's stated arguments evidence
as to his or her internal state of mind about the matter in question. Is
this a satisfactory model of professional behavior in the context of
compelling-interest justifications placed before a court, particularly if
one is indeed concerned with process?
There is, of course, one important difference between the lawyer
making a compelling interest argument and the "typical" lawyer. It is
always the case that the former will be representing the state, most
often as a direct employee, occasionally as outside counsel hired to
represent "the people" in given litigation. Does this status, should this
status, make any difference? There is surely some reason to believe
that the answer is yes. Chief Judge Abner Mikva, of the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, described as "remarkable" the
assertion by a lawyer representing the Federal Energy Regulation
Commission that "government attorneys ought not be held to higher
standards than attorneys for private litigants." 62 In response, Judge
Mikva not only pointed out that the American Bar Association's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility holds government attor-
neys to "higher [ethical] standards than private lawyers," 63 but he also
quoted from a Supreme Court opinion describing the government
lawyer as "the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
versy, . . . but of a sovereign whose obligation ... is not that it shall
win a case, but that justice shall be done."64 Douglas Letter, a staff
attorney for the Department of Justice, has recently written of "the
unique role of government attorneys" and endorsed the view that "the
public should hold [them] to extremely high standards of ethics, mo-
rality, and responsibility."65 One way, of course, that these attorneys
60. See generally Sanford Levinson, Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Any-
thing At All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL LJ. 353 (1986).
61. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225 (1986).
62. See Freeport-McMoRan Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC, 962 F.2d 45,46 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
63. Id. at 47; see MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14 (1981).
64. Freeport-McMoRan, 962 F.2d at 47 (quoting Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935)).
65. Douglas Letter, Lawyering and Judging on Behalf of the United States: All I Ask
for Is a Little Respect, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1295, 1296 (1993); see Geoffrey P. Miller,
Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CH. L. REv. 1293
(1987). See also the fascinating discussion by Herbert Wechsler of his role as an Assistant
can demonstrate such responsibility is by actively monitoring the con-
scientiousness displayed by legislatures and refusing, on appropriate
occasions, to defend the handiwork of these legislatures.
There are precedents for such action by public attorneys. During
the Carter Administration, the Department of Justice refused to de-
fend the constitutionality of a section of the Public Broadcasting Act
of 196766 that conditioned aid from the Corporation for Public Broad-
casting on agreement by the receiving station to forego "editorializ-
ing." As the Supreme Court put it:
The Department of Justice informed both Houses of the Congress
that it had decided not to defend the constitutionality of the statute.
Attorney General Civiletti stated that the "Department of Justice is,
of course, fully mindful of its duty to support the laws enacted by
Congress. Here, however, the Department has determined, after
careful study and deliberation, that reasonable arguments cannot be
advanced to defend the challenged statute."
67
In this instance, of course, the First Amendment was implicated,
and presumably the Department's lawyers saw their task as presenting
to the Court an argument that there was indeed a "compelling" need
for the statute in question. There is an interesting ambiguity in Attor-
ney General Civiletti's comment: Did he mean to suggest that no rea-
sonable person could believe that there was such a compelling
interest, or only-and much less dramatically-that he and his staff,
after their own study, simply rejected the argument supporting the
presence of a compelling interest, even though one need not be de-
scribed as unreasonable if taking the opposite view? That is, did the
Department of Justice engage in first-order or second-order review?
But there is another feature of this case that deserves mention in
the context of this Article. Given that the congressional regulation
did not directly prohibit speech, but instead simply conditioned the
receipt of federal funds on the waiver of one's right to editorialize, it is
not at all clear what legal standard in fact was in effect. Do such waiv-
ers, even of First Amendment rights, require the state to run the
gauntlet of strict scrutiny? There is surely support for the view that
Attorney General of the United States called upon to prepare the brief defending the
internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II in Norman Silber & Geoffrey
Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law: Selections from the Oral History of Her-
bert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 854, 882-91 (1993).
66. Pub. L. No. 90-129, § 201(8), 81 Stat. 364, 368 (1967) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 399
(1988)).
67. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 370-71 n.18 (1984) (emphasis
added).
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they do in such cases as Sherbert,68 the case relied on by congressional
supporters of RFRA. But there is just as clearly opposite authority.69
We are, of course, deep in the morass of the single most pervasive
issue of the modern welfare state-the problem of so-called "uncon-
stitutional conditions," in which the "central question," as identified
by Justice Douglas, "is whether the government by force of its largesse
has the power to 'buy up' rights guaranteed by the Constitution." 70
In any event, there is every reason to believe that the Justice De-
partment had to consider both strictly legal arguments (i.e., what stan-
dard of review was proper with regard to the placing of conditions by
Congress on the speech of recipients of federal assistance) and factual
ones (i.e., what the likely empirical consequences of unregulated, as
against regulated, broadcasters were with regard to the quite different
public interests asserted by both Congress and the broadcasters). As
it happens, perhaps unsurprisingly, the Justice Department switched
its position when the Reagan administration came into power, and
four Justices agreed with the new Department position that Congress
indeed had the constitutional power to condition the federal fund-
ing.71 Even though four does not comprise a majority, I believe it
nonetheless demonstrates beyond serious doubt that the argument on
behalf of the law was scarcely frivolous.
It is worth noting that Civiletti's action might exemplify an espe-
cially strong model of due process of lawmaking insofar as it repre-
sents a genuinely independent executive-branch determination of the
issues even after congressional hearings and deliberation. That is, if
one is truly concerned with protecting fundamental rights from all but
the most "compelling" limitations, then one might well want any re-
strictions to pass through multiple institutional filters in order to be-
come pure enough to be deemed constitutional. The first filter,
obviously, is that of the legislature itself; but a second filter could be
independent executive-branch review. A third filter, of course, would
be the de novo kind of review seen in the classic free speech
paradigm.
68. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
69. See, for example, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), which deals with the
requirement by AFDC recipients that they agree to occasional "home visits" by a welfare
caseworker. "[T]he visitation in itself is not forced or compelled, and ... the beneficiary's
denial of permission is not a criminal act. If consent to the visitation is withheld, no visita-
tion takes place. The aid then never begins or merely ceases, as the case may be." Id. at
317-18.
70. Id. at 328 & n.6 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
71. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 365 (5-4 decision).
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Let us return to Oregon, though, and the duties facing the public
attorney faced with the charge of assessing the merits of the claims
raised in Smith. Assume that I am correct in my surmise that the Ore-
gon legislature had done nothing to indicate it had wrestled with the
claims of the Native American users of peyote and had concluded,
with whatever measure of reluctance, that the highest interests of the
state just did not allow an exemption. My argument is that there is in
effect no "judgment" of the legislature to defer to; instead, all that is
truly present is the ink on the statutory page. To be sure, it indicates
that drug use, including the use of peyote, is a major problem that
deserves attention of law enforcement authorities. But we just do not
know if the legislature believes that universal enforcement is so im-
portant to achieving admittedly important ends that it overrides all
other important values, including the concern and respect due those
whose identity is significantly constituted by membership in religious
communities and performance of central rituals.
Now one response to this problem is to argue that the Attorney
General is licensed to "make up a story" about how the legislature
might hypothetically have behaved had it addressed the issue. And it
is surely possible that the legislature, when confronted with the magni-
tude of the drug problem and the potential costs of an exemption,
would have gone full-speed ahead with the unadorned language that
was actually passed initially. One way, of course, to check the
probability of this hypothesis is to engage in careful independent
study of the problem and place oneself in the position of a model leg-
islator devoted to protecting constitutional liberty, except when the
truly compelling interests of the society, mediated through political
representatives, demand otherwise. If the Attorney General con-
cludes that this high standard is met, then he or she is fully authorized,
I would argue, to defend the state law, even within an approach that
emphasizes "due process of lawmaking."
Oregon's brief in Smith is certainly replete with language sug-
gesting the magnitude of its interests. Beginning with mention of the
"drug crisis pervad[ing] every facet of our citizens' lives, '72 Attorney
General David Frohnmayer, the principal signatory of the brief (and
the oral advocate before the Court in Smith IV), goes on to note that
Oregon, like the United States, includes peyote in the list of so-called
Schedule I drugs-those presenting the greatest danger to users.73 In-
terestingly enough, the argument against "accommodating" Native
72. Brief for Petitioners at 12, Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 872 (No. 88-1213).
73. Id. at 13-14.
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American users of peyote is directed far less at any dangers presented
by Native Americans themselves, or potential costs to the state were
only Native Americans exempted, and far more at the impossibility of
limiting exemptions in this manner.74 That is, "[a]s a constitutional
matter, any protection extended to [Native Americans] for their reli-
gious peyote use should honor not only their claim to religious free-
dom, but it should honor all others on like terms." 75 Given the wide
number of religious sects that incorporate drug use into their ceremo-
nies or rituals, though, this reasoning would, if taken seriously, wreak
74. Dean Frohnmayer, who, not surprisingly, does not agree with the arguments I
make in the text, has emphasized in conversation that Oregon was not prosecuting the
petitioners in Smith for their use of peyote, but, rather, only trying to argue that the state
could legitimately deny unemployment benefits to those dismissed because of their use of
illegal drugs from the staff of a drug-rehabilitation program. Moreover, one should con-
sider the implications of the following exchange during oral argument in which he seem-
ingly disavows a compelling state interest in each and every prosecution even as he
continues to emphasize the problems of a constitutional requirement that all religiously
motivated users of drugs be exempt from criminal punishment:
Justice Kennedy: You do concede, I take it, that the enforcement of the Oregon
criminal law would in effect destroy the Native American church and its ritual in
your state.
Mr. Frohnmayer We don't concede that, Justice Kennedy, for a very practical
reason. The Oregon criminal prohibition.., has been on the books for more than
a decade. There is no suggestion in our state that that religion has been destroyed
by inappropriate police intrusion into the tepee ceremony. In most-
Question: What do you mean by inappropriate police intrusion? You are assert-
ing that they have the right to intrude.
Mr. Frohnmayer: We are-
Question: If they haven't been destroyed, it is just that you have had inefficient
enforcement.
Mr. Frohnmayer: We have had priorities in police enforcement that are under-
standable in terms of what is at stake....
Question: .... Are you saying that you are not going to enforce the criminal law
if we sustain it?
Mr. Frohnmayer: No, we are not saying that. We are saying that... there may
be, in the specific context of the specific use by a person accused of the specific
crime, special state constitutional restrictions on the state which have not yet
been explored. We do not know the contours of those exemptions....
Justice O'Connor. But if-if the contour is just to forgive or exempt the use of
peyote by members of the Native American Church, you would then be back here
arguing that that violates the Establishment Clause.
Mr. Frohnmayer If the defense were that the specific church and that church
only was entitled to the exemption, that would very probably be the case, Justice
O'Connor.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 25-27, Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 872 (No. 88-1213). Note,
incidentally, the Idaho statute, see supra note 14, which is just so limited. Whether that
statute could survive constitutional scrutiny is beyond the scope of this Article, but Gen-
eral Frohnmayer's point scarcely seems easy to dismiss. RFRA, of course, is not specifi-
cally confined to any given religions.
75. Id. at 18.
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havoc with Oregon's "compelling interest in comprehensive drug con-
trol." If not taken seriously-that is, if exemptions as a matter of fact
were limited to Native Americans-then the victim would be the Es-
tablishment Clause's requirement of "religious neutrality. '76 As I
have already indicated, these are serious arguments that cannot be
casually dismissed.
But did the Attorney General's arguments in Smith IV represent
in fact an independent conclusion, sincerely presented to the Court,
that the highest interests of the state required general enforcement of
the criminal prohibition? One answer, obviously, is that it is impossi-
ble to know and that the principle of charity of interpretation should
resolve any doubts in the Attorney General's favor. Things get more
complicated, though, in part because of the response of the Oregon
Department of Justice, at a time when it was still headed by Attorney
General Frohnmayer, regarding the bill establishing the new affirma-
tive defense against criminal prosecution for peyote use. On April 5,
1991, approximately eighteen months after the November 6, 1989 oral
argument before the Supreme Court, Jerome Lidz, an Assistant Attor-
ney General and Chief Civil Attorney in the Appellate Division,77 tes-
tified before the Family Justice Subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee of the Oregon House of Representatives. "I am respond-
ing to the Subcommittee's request to the Department of Justice for
technical assistance on the drafting of H.B. 3039. The Department
takes no position on the merits of the bilL"
'78
I find the italicized language immensely interesting, and more
than a little troublesome, for the following reasons. If the Attorney
General and his colleagues had genuinely concluded, after careful in-
dependent study, that the highest interests of Oregon indeed com-
pelled the nonexemption of religious users of peyote, then one would
surely expect him to convey that information to the Subcommittee.
He did not. There are, to be sure, concerns expressed, but that is not
one of them.79
76. Id.
77. Mr. Lidz was another signatory of Oregon's brief to the Supreme Court.
78. Testimony of Jerome Lidz, Assistant Attorney General, on H.B. 3039, Before
House Judiciary Family Justice Subcomm., Apr. 5, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter Testimony of
Jerome Lidz] (emphasis added) (copy on file with author). Again, I express my thanks to
the Oregon State Archives for sending me a copy of Mr. Lidz's statement.
79. In a very helpful telephone conversation that took place on April 15, 1994, Mr.
Lidz took issue with the interpretation in the text. He noted that the Oregon Department
of Justice rarely takes positions on bills before the Oregon Legislature. The Department
views its task primarily as facilitative, generally leaving it up to other state agencies to
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support or condemn proposed legislation. It would, then, have been far more noteworthy
had it expressed a view instead of taking its basically agnostic posture.
The Department, though, was indeed concerned about the bill because of the concerns
expressed in the Smith briefs about the impossibility of keeping any exemption cabined
and thus unavailable to many other, far less attractive, claimants for religious exemptions
to general Oregon law. Thus, Lidz says, "If we had our druthers, we would have recom-
mended against the bill." It was clear, though, that the legislature was going to pass a bill.
What was required, then, was "damage control. The legislature told us they were going to
do something; we wanted to have as good a bill as possible." Had it been a very broad
bill-like RFRA, say-then Lidz suggests that the Department might in fact have opposed
it. But the statute being considered (and subsequently passed) was "narrowly confined"
and limited to peyote, the drug that caused the least problems. Moreover, it offered an
"affirmative defense" to prosecution rather than a blanket "exemption." "If, after helping
to draft it, we had said we were opposed to it, we would have lost a fair amount of legisla-
tive credibility." Moreover, opposition might have triggered another, more troublesome
bill. Nor should one ignore the fact that the bill-and, presumably, the Department's ac-
quiescence-was an attempt "to heal the wounds created by the Smith decision." Tele-
phone Interview with Jerome Lidz, Oregon Department of Justice (Apr. 15, 1994).
In a follow-up letter, Mr. Lidz emphasized "two further points about the process" that
should be taken into account:
First,... we believed that a statutory solution was very different from a constitu-
tional exemption. If the statute turned out to be a mistake (e.g., proved to be
unworkable, caused a court to extend the defense to other drugs, or led to ram-
pant drug abuse among [Native American] Church members) the legislature
could fix it. If the Court had decreed a religious exemption from drug laws, the
state would have had no means to respond if it turned out to have serious nega-
tive consequences.
Second, the last substantive paragraph of Justice Scalia's decision, referring
to the legislatures' role in protecting free exercise, essentially invited legislation
like H.B. 3039. Prior to the Smith decision, we would have regarded the legisla-
ture's authority to adopt such a bill as highly questionable. So, to the extent that
our nonopposition to the bill reflected a change in position on the question of
legislative power, it was in response to Scalia's opinion.
More generally: In the Smith case, we were sensitive to the free exercise
interest, but we felt strongly that the answers offered by the other side and by the
Oregon court's opinion were wholly unsatisfactory, for failing to deal realistically
with the Establishment Clause issues .... I continue to think that sympathy for
the Native American Church, or evidence about its particular practices, would
not have been a good basis for creating an exemption from criminal laws that
nearly everyone agreed should still apply to the rest of the public, including most
if not all of those who might claim a religious defense. A decision that would
have mandated inquiries into the sincerity or validity of religious beliefs and prac-
tices was an alarming prospect to us. That's not to deny the importance of the
free exercise value, but to defend our decision to assert the countervailing
interest.
Letter from Jerome Lidz to Sanford Levinson (Apr. 22, 1994) (on file with author).
I want not only to underscore my gratitude for Mr. Lidz's comments, but also to em-
phasize my respect for the deep thought that Mr. Lidz and his colleagues obviously put into
the substantive issues raised by Smith and its aftermath. Nothing in this Article should be
read as suggesting otherwise, even as I want to raise questions about how we should struc-
ture our political institutions, including lawyers within such agencies as departments of
justice, to protect against too-easy limitation of important constitutional rights. That I be-
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Mr. Lidz notes that an exemption cannot be extended only to Na-
tive Americans "[blecause the Oregon Constitution prohibits any
preference for one religion over another"; thus, the extension of "the
affirmative defense respecting peyote to all religions and religious
practices on the same terms is essential to its constitutionality."80 This
raises the obvious likelihood that other religious groups will "claim
constitutional entitlement to use their 'sacrament,' even if it is not pe-
yote."' Mr. Lidz therefore offers some practical advice:
To guard against that, the legislative history should reflect some of
the reasons that peyote is different from other drugs; for instance,
that because of its limited availability and the history of its responsi-




Although the constitutionality of H.B. 3039 is not free from doubt,
we think that the bill has been drafted to minimize constitutional
concerns. Although we cannot guarantee success in the courts, we
believe that we can defend the affirmative defense to prosecution
for peyote use if the Legislative Assembly chooses to adopt it.
83
I find it difficult to interpret Mr. Lidz's testimony as other than a
denial of central aspects of Oregon's case as presented to the Supreme
Court eighteen months before. The interests of Oregon so vividly and
passionately portrayed to the Court, including the "devastating" im-
lieve the Oregon Department of Justice might have done more (and, more to the point,
that the doctrinal scaffolding that structures inquiry into the presence of "compelling state
interests" might well be rewritten to require greater inquiry into the adequacy of legislative
consideration of relevant issues) does not mean that it did nothing or that it was dismissive
of the rights at stake.
80. Testimony of Jerome Lidz, supra note 78, at 2. Indeed, the significance of this
aspect of the Oregon Constitution to the State's argument in Smith itself must be
emphasized:
[T]he Oregon Board of Pharmacy declined respondent Smith's request to create
an exemption for [Native American Church (NAC)] peyote use in part because
the Oregon Constitution would require expansion of the exemption to other reli-
gions. In this respect, Oregon's interest may differ from those of other states. An
exemption for the NAC alone, even one dictated by the federal constitution,
would compel Oregon under its state constitution to extend the same accommo-
dation to other religious organizations and individuals. Oregon thus cannot crack
the door open, as respondents implicitly urge, without permitting it to swing wide.
No judicial or legislative body in the country has viewed that result as anything
less than devastating to government's compelling interest in controlling danger-
ous drugs.
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 19, Smith IV, 494 U.S. at 872 (No. 88-1213) (copy on file with
author); see also supra note 31.
81. Testimony of Jerome Lidz, supra note 78, at 2.
82. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
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pact a general religious exemption would have on Oregon's "compel-
ling interest in controlling dangerous drugs,"' 4 have, in effect,
disappeared from view. There is nothing said to remind the legislators
of the Department's 1987 opposition, presumably based on these
same law-enforcement concerns, to the proposed grant by the Oregon
Board of Pharmacy of an exemption to the Native American Church
for its use of peyote.85 To be sure, the Department never once indi-
cates its actual support for the exemption, but this absence of overt
support seems secondary to the silence that has almost deafeningly
replaced the Department's former statements.
Conclusion
Perhaps one should not be troubled by this posture of the Oregon
Department of Justice toward its legislative "client," whose handiwork
it will defend before reviewing courts. It is clearly similar to the stan-
dard posture of the private-market lawyer. Yet it seems to me that
both Douglas Letter and Judge Mikva are correct: More should be
expected from the high-level public attorney, at-least in a regime that
purports to take individual liberty seriously. David Frohnmayer was,
by common consent, one of the most able state attorneys general in
recent years, not only in Oregon but in the nation. I do not mean to
censure his conduct in the Smith case even as I do mean respectfully
to raise some questions about it. I do believe that the process re-
vealed in the Smith litigation should give us pause; it should count as
an independent reason to object to the decision in that case.
RFRA gives us reason to believe that there will in the future be
perhaps thousands of cases like Smith. We all have a compelling inter-
est in clarifying what courts should do when presented the task of de-
termining if a "compelling interest" undergirds a given law before
them. The question is of special practical urgency to the men and wo-
men who will actually be called upon to assess a statute or govern-
mental practice. But it should also be of special interest to anyone
84. See supra note 80.
85. Thus Oregon told the Supreme Court that
[t]he Oregon Board of Pharmacy retracted an NAC-specific exemption after first
promulgating one at respondent Smith's request. The Board did so after asking
for the Oregon Attorney General's review of the rule and after being advised that
a denomination-specific exemption, if within the Board's authority to enact,
would violate the Oregon Constitution.
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 19 n.36. And a wider exemption, as already noted, was as-
serted to have "devastating" consequences.
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concerned with the general problem of reconciling public values and
individual rights in constitutional adjudication.
